We review the evolution of modern Chinese intellectual property right (IPR) laws and enforcement and explore economic and political forces involved in international conflicts over Chinese IPR protection. Our analysis considers why the U.S. and China moved from conflict to cooperation over intellectual property rights. Structural and institutional aspects of the political economy of IPRs within each country are considered, and data on Chinese-U.S. trade in intellectual property-intensive goods are examined. We conclude that although enforcement of IPRs within China continues to be relatively weak, Chinese IPR institutions are converging on those in the OECD nations.
I. INTRODUCTION
Relations between China and the United States have become increasingly complicated over the last decade, with a large number of political and economic issues in dispute. Prominent among these issues have been the recurring disputes between the United States and China over Chinese protection of foreign intellectual property. Since 1991 four bilateral agreements between China and the United States have addressed Chinese protection of intellectual property rights (IPRS). While the agreements were accompanied in the mid-1990s by U.S. complaints over violations and subsequent bilateral tensions, the end of the millennium saw increased Chinese efforts to enforce foreign and domestic IPRS and less tension over the issue between the two governments.
Our focus in this paper is on the economic and political foundations of the ongoing disputes between the two governments as well as the rapid convergence of Chinese IPR law and enforcement to OECD standards. International politics have clearly played an important role in the disputes. For example, the 1996 dispute over IPRs was, at least in part, a spillover from the wider sphere of U.S.-China relations, in particular the contention over Taiwan policies and the 1996 visit of Taiwan's president to the United States. Domestic politics have played a role in the disputes, with the mid-1990s leadership transition in China (from Deng Xiaoping to Jiang Zemin) and the 1996 U.S. presidential election increasing the need for politicians in both countries to become less flexible in their public stances, thereby further extending IPR negotiations and deepening tensions. Economic considerations have also played a fundamental role in these disputes.
As a net exporter of intellectual property as well as IPR-intensive products, the United States has incentives to pressure China to upgrade IPR laws and enforcement, while China, a net importer of intellectual property and IPR-intensive goods, has incentives to resist.
1 Relations between the two parties are tempered by the limited capacity of China's legal system and society to change rapidly in response to both domestic and foreign pressures. We argue that China's desire to join the World Trade Organization (WTO) fundamentally changed the nature of the game due to the WTO's strong minimum standards for IPR laws and the veto held by the United States and the European Union over Chinese ascension to WTO membership.
II. IPRS IN CHINA AND RECURRING DISPUTES WITH THE UNITED STATES
Prior to its enactment of modern IPR laws in the 1980s, China had three decades of checkered experiences with intellectual property institutions borrowed from the USSR.
The October 1949 founding of the PRC was Chinese characters, and number of copies printed.
The Cultural Revolution (1965 Revolution ( -1976 led to the complete breakdown of this system. The professional activities of scientists, artists and writers were severely The following two paragraphs are based on Alford (1995, ch. 4 (Alford, 1995, ch. 3) . 4 See Yu (1994) , Yeh (1996) , and Pun (1996) for more extensive discussions.
Treaty.
• Domestic Laws. • Special IPR Courts. China has establishhed special IPR courts in 5 provinces and cities: Hainan, Guangdong, Fujian, Beijing, and Shanghai (Kolton, 1996) . Specialized courts were set up to ensure that judges well versed in complex IPR law hear these cases. The new Chinese courts have awarded monetary damages to major American corporations, such as Prentice Hall, Harcourt Brace, and World Disney as remedies for copyright violations. Foreign firms have, however, complained that Chinese courts have few mechanisms for enforcing their orders. 5 Foreign attention has also been focused on Article 62(3) of TRIPS which requires that all final administrative decisions with respect to IPRs be subject to review by a judicial or quasi-judicial authority. Currently, most administrative decisions in China are final. China's courts also do not allow the award of damages in IPR infringement cases in which the infringer was unaware that infringement was taking place. This conflicts with Article 45(2) of TRIPS which allows for damages even if the infringer was unaware that the infringing activity was against the law.
• IPR Databases. Monetary aid and personnel training from the German government helped the Chinese government to establish electronic data bases for patents in 1995.
• Training Programs. Several major universities, e.g., Beijing University, the People's University, and Wuhan University, have established IPR training programs for judges, lawyers, government IPR officials, and businessmen.
• Software Title Verification Office. Opened in Beijing in May 1997, this office is intended to act as a liaison between Chinese CD-ROM manufacturers and American software publishers. The Office is supposed to verify the legitimacy of a software order at a Chinese factory by verifying a contract with the software's original publisher.
• Internet IPRs. China has been slow to pass legislation regulating internet copyright Since 1994, U.S. complaints have generally focused on enforcement of IPRs rather than changes in their content. In 1994, the USTR complained to the Chinese Government that Chinese firms were violating U.S. copyrights on a variety of goods, including computer software, CDs, LDs, and audiocassettes. Chinese media laws restricted the lawful distribution of imported CDs and cassette tapes, yet a large majority of the 75 million CDs produced in China contained copyrighted songs used without permission of their owners. Outdoor markets near major universities, such as in the Zhongguancun district near Beijing University, openly sold pirated software programs.
The Computer Software Association reported that China purchased just $1 of software per desktop computer, the lowest rate in the world. The Chinese government responded to U.S. complaints by shutting down several CD factories producing pirated discs; the United States government responded by threatening to impose trade sanctions beginning February 26, 1995 unless additional enforcement was undertaken. Formal U.S. sanctions would take the form of retaliatory tariffs on Chinese exports, such as cellular telephones, sporting goods, and plastic items.
More importantly, the United States would continue to veto China's application to become a member of the World Trade Organization. China quickly responded by announcing that it would retaliate by imposing tariffs on selected U.S. goods, such as alcohol, cigarettes, video games, and compact discs; suspending joint venture talks with U.S. automobile companies; and possibly purchasing more aircraft from Europe's Airbus Industrie Consortium rather than the U.S.'s Boeing Company.
The conflict was resolved when China agreed to a new bilateral copyright agreement just hours after the U.S. deadline expired. The detailed 30-page text contained numerous important features.
• Export of infringing products prohibited;
• Factories producing infringing CDs to be closed;
• A title verification system to be established to prevent use or sale of audio visual works without the consent of the U.S. copyright owner;
• IPR working groups to be established at the central, provincial, and local levels to coordinate enforcement efforts and to draft and implement regulations and legislation;
• Focused enforcement efforts to be established for IPRs in audio visual works, computer programs, and publications;
• National treatment for civil filing fees and expeditious handling of IPR cases involving foreigners to be implemented; foreigners will have the right to initiate investigations of infringement of their rights, to petition relevant authorities for enforcement action, and to collect and submit evidence towards their complaints;
• No quotas to be established on U.S. audio visual products;
6 Reuters, Jan. 20, 1995. • Record companies to be allowed to market their entire catalog of works subject to censorship concerns;
• All IPR laws, regulations, interpretations, rules, and decrees to be compiled and published by September 1, 1995;
• U.S. IPR-related companies to be allowed to enter into joint ventures for the production and reproduction of their works in China. Initial ventures limited to Shanghai and Guangzhou and expanded to 11 other cities by 2000. 
III. THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF STRENGTHENING IPRS IN CHINA
In this section we briefly review the potential costs and benefits to China of strengthening their intellectual property regime. Though necessarily speculative, this discussion is informed by a growing literature on the relationship between IPRs and economic development. 11 The interested reader is referred to more extensive literature surveys (Besen and Raskind 1991 , Evenson and Westphal 1997 , Maskus and Konan 1994 , Primo Braga 1996 , and Maskus 2000 .
Innovation and creative works may benefit China by adding to the variety of products available, improving the quality and attributes of existing products, and enriching culture. Innovative and creative works differ from most other goods in that they are nonrivalrous, i.e., the inventors may find it prohibitively costly to exclude an imitator from reproducing their creative works. Unless property rights in intellectual innovations are established and their enforcement is facilitated by the rule of law, market participants will have little incentive to compensate creators once the innovation becomes public knowledge. By limiting market access, IPR owners are able to charge a monopoly price above the production cost. This price should be sufficiently high to compensate the 11 Gould and Gruben (1996) found no relationship between stronger patent laws and economic growth but that a strong relationship between patent strength interacted with a measure of trade liberalization and economic growth. Park and Ginarte (1997) found no relationship between stronger patent laws and economic growth but that strong IPR protection increases physical investment and R&D spending, two basic determinants of economic growth.
inventor for production and creative costs, provide a reasonable rate of profit, and offset the risk burden associated with the creative process. Yet by allowing IPR owners to set monopoly prices for the duration of the intellectual property right, ex post efficiency losses result as the IPR restricts availability and increases cost of using existing creative products. Thus a tradeoff exists. Too weak IPR protection discourages creative activity and dampens variety of products available while too strong protection provides excessive market power.
As China becomes more integrated in the world economy, intellectual innovations spill over its borders more readily. A large number of studies have isolated numerous determinates of the gains or losses from a country's adoption of stronger IPRs in a global context. 12 They include the country's potential to attract foreign investment; whether the country's firms are capable of developing patentable products and processes; the ability of the country's R&D sector to respond to the new incentives; and the popularity of domestic music, films, art, computer programs, and other literary works. Will China gain from adopting stronger IPRs and enforcing foreign and domestic intellectual property rights more closely? The answer depends on the strength and interaction of several important effects.
Rent Transfer Effect
As a net importer of innovation and technology, China has traditionally maintained low IPR protection to encourage low-cost imitation. Chinese firms regularly counterfeit foreign copyrighted movies, music, and computer software. The technology for high-quality copying is readily available. For example, CD replicators cost only $2.5 million each in 1997 (down from $30 million in 1987) and are "small, portable, and easy to use." 13 Manufacturers of CD replicators in the Netherlands, Germany, and Sweden regularly soldl replicators to Chinese firms in the mid-1990s without inquiring whether they were using them to produce CDs containing pirated music. Unauthorized use of prominent foreign trademarks on goods such as clothing, watches, and handbags is also widespread. The temptation to infringe on IPRs is fueled by the large gap between the market price of the legitimate product and the cost of production of "close" imitations.
The ability to imitate technology in labor-intensive industries enables many Chinese firms to compete effectively in global markets. The percentage of GDP as trade (imports plus exports) has increased from 9.8% in 1978 to 34.42% in 1999 (China Statistical Yearbook, 1999 .
The strengthening of IPR protection essentially raises China's cost of technology acquisition as local producers are forced to either pay royalties to Western IPR owners or to exit the market. This induces increases in product prices and a transfer of rents and royalties from Chinese consumers and producers to foreign IPR owners (Chin and Grossman 1988 , Maskus 1990 , Deardorff 1990 , Helpman 1993 . From China's perspective, tighter IPRs imply a deterioration in its terms of trade. Thus, it is unsurprising to observe the Chinese government trying to "jawbone" foreign patent holders proposing to collect fees deemed "excessive" by the Chinese government. Recent protests by the Chinese government against a plan by six foreign DVD developers to collect additional royalties from China's DVD equipment manufacturers falls into this Konan (1994) , and Chin and Grossman (1991 (Sherwood, 1991) .
When a firm seeks to protect its reputation for quality, however, it may prefer FDI over either exports or transferring technology to a local vendor when intellectual property protection is low (Horstmann and Markusen 1987) . Indeed, in interviews with foreign enterprise managers in China, Maskus and Dougherty (1998) recognize a reluctance to license technologies or otherwise transfer technologies to local operations because of perceived weak IPRs. They identify several defensive measures such as the transfer of only old technologies to joint venture partners, the establishment of strict vertical supply chains to monitor quality and to conceal underlying technologies, and sale to only large established firms with a premium placed on quality, i.e., public enterprises or hospitals.
Weak IPR protection could also induce firms to decide not to export goods to China or to produce them in China. For example, during the 1990s international seed producers restricted the export of some seed varieties to Chinese farmers due to poorly specified well as foreign authors.
IPRs for new plant varieties in China.
17 Maskus and Konan (1994) tested the relationship between FDI and IPRs using a cross-sectional sample of 44 countries and found only weak evidence of a positive relationship.
18 Lee and Mansfield (1996) 
A. Domestic Forces at Work
Chinese inventors and artists are producing important inventions in some industries, 17 China recently upgraded its IPRs protecting plant varieties as part of the package of measures passed to facilitate compliance with TRIPS Agreement. 18 A wide range of other conditions will play a prominent role in a firm's decision to engage in technology transfer, FDI, or exports. The IPR regime may be a rather minor element in a firm's decision to transfer technology or invest in China. 19 Firms in the Lee and Mansfield study were not questioned regarding their opinions of the Chinese IPR system or their activities in China. 20 Lee and Mansfield's regression study adjusted for market size but did not include an interaction variable as well as literary, artistic, and musical works. There has been a rapid growth in Chinese patent applications (Table 1) . As privatization progresses, many present and former state- <INSERT TABLE ONE> owned enterprises are also seeking means to protect developed or acquired technological innovations (Oksenberg, et al 1996) . Consider, for example, dicyclol, a pharmaceutical inhibiting replication of hepatitis B and C viruses and reducing hepatitis manifestations.
Developed by the Pharmaceutical Institute of the Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences, it has been patented in 13 countries and could be a significant source of income for the Academy-if its patent is enforced. Piracy in pharmaceuticals is widespread in China.
In terms of trademarks and copyrights, Maskus and Dougherty (1998) Poorer interior provincesl have less interest in strengthening IPRs than richer, more technologically-advanced coastal provinces, as the rent-transfer effects are likely to dominate innovation and technology-transfer effects in the short run in poor provinces, as firms in poor provinces using imitated technologies will have to license the technology and consumers in poor provinces will have to pay higher prices for the firms' products.
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Even inside richer provinces, the industries capable of producing new technologies may often be small and poorly organized, precisely because of the country's lack of IPR protection. Both factors contribute to slowing down the transition to stronger IPRs.
Given this scenario, foreign pressure to strengthen domestic IPR laws may provide an effective mechanism for overcoming the deadweight losses generated by the interest group logjam (La Croix 1992). The developed country's threat to retaliate against the developing country's exporters will induce the exporters to increase their lobbying activities to strengthen IPRs. In some cases the enhanced coalition pushing for stronger IPRs will be sufficient to override strong, organized domestic lobbies that would suffer losses under a stronger IPR regime. From the perspective of a welfare-maximizing social planner, foreign pressure has, however, a major drawback, as developed countries may push for a transition path to stronger IPRs that is faster than the optimal path for the developing country. We are, therefore, left with the paradox that foreign pressure with respect to IPRs may be privately welcomed by the domestic government yet publicly resisted in order to limit its overreach by foreign countries.
It is also immensely difficult for China to enforce IPRs effectively without a 22 Maskus and Dougherty (1998) . 23 Higher licensing fees could have a variety of effects. They could reduce profits of a fixed number of firms facing inelastic demands; they could put some firms out of business (as higher fixed costs can reduce the optimal number of firms in the market); they could put some firms out of business due to consumer broader, well-established legal infrastructure. Even in the United States, intellectual property is amongst the most sophisticated and rapidly changing areas of law (Oksenburg et al., 1996) . With private ownership a somewhat recent phenomenon, laws governing private property of any sort are neither deep nor broad. Ross (1996) observed that the Chinese central government "simply lacks the authority" to end much of the piracy in the Chinese economy. IPR regulations mandated by the central government are often ignored by corrupt local officials who share in the profits from piracy. China has established a special court system that is dedicated to resolving IPR disputes. Jenckes (1997) argued that "these new courts do not provide a forum for American businesses seeking to uphold their copyrights." They often lack appropriate mechanisms for enforcing their decisions.
Access to the IPR courts by individuals and small firms is also limited by the requirement that a proportion of the claimed damages be posted as a bond.
With public enforcement efforts limited by China's antiquated court system, Chinese and foreign firms are organizing into associations which would undertake additional private enforcement, place pressure on government to continue enforcement efforts, and keep the issue before the public. Shanghai's first anti-piracy association was formed in November 2000 by 43 firms with well-known trademarks. 24 The State Bureau of Copyrights has established a national "anti-piracy union." The union has administrative power to investigate, gather evidence, report activities, and even issue penalties.
Progress on IPR enforcement may, therefore, ultimately proceed at the same slow pace as legal reform in China. Strengthening IPR enforcement is particularly costly in a response to the higher prices; or there could a combination of the last two effects. 24 Foreign and Chinese software companies have formed a similar organization.
developing country, as it requires not only the application of scarce legal professionals but also the application of scarce scientific and engineering professionals to this activity.
A key source of pressure on China's government to strengthen IPRs comes from associations in China representing foreign businesses and joint ventures. 25 Maskus and Dougherty (1998) survey managers in Chinese high-technology industries, such as information technology and software, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, and biotechnology.
Discussed above, they find that foreign enterprise and joint venture managers in China are much more likely to perceive IPR enforcement as a stumbling block than their local enterprise counterparts. Direct foreign investment has been a source of economic growth and technology transfer. Thus pressure placed on China's government from foreign business associations is encouraging change.
B. The Political Economy of U.S. Pressure
American pressure on China followed a decade of pressure on other Asian developing countries to reform their IPRs. From the early 1980s the United States has threatened countries with weak IPR laws and institutions through its "Special 301" provisions of U.S. trade law (Konan, et al 1995) . Special 301 allows the U.S. Trade
Representative to investigate foreign protection of U.S. intellectual property, to negotiate for higher standards of protection, and to retaliate with trade sanctions if negotiations fail.
<INSERT TABLE TWO>
As Asian IPR laws approached the standards set in developed countries, the focus of U.S. and European pressure shifted to monitoring enforcement of IPRs, particularly computer software and entertainment copyrights. States and the trade in IPR-intensive goods between the two countries to determine whether there is any evidence for this contention.
<INSERT TABLE 3> Table 3 presents import and export data (millions of dollars) for copyrightprotected, patent-protected, and trademark-protected goods. We adopt the classifications used by Keith Maskus (1990 Maskus ( , 1993 and travel goods and handbags (SITC 831), the intellectual property component of these products (trademarks) tends to be foreign-owned. Indeed, China's strong comparative advantage in these sectors may be partially attributable to relatively weak protection for foreign, especially U.S., trademarks. The U.S. pressure on China to strengthen their IPRs reflects, in part, the desire to protect its intellectual property in these heavily traded 30 The pharmaceutical sector is a notable exception to this pattern.
trademark-sensitive sectors.
The volume of trade in copyrighted goods seems very small, particularly given the U.S. comparative advantage in many copyrighted goods, such as literary works, computer software, music and films. The low trade flows for copyright-intensive goods in Tables 3   and 4 may, in fact, distort the measured RCAMs as well as provide additional evidence that extensive piracy of these goods is occurring in China.
Related is the American concern over its ballooning overall trade deficit, and the increasingly large bilateral trade deficit with China (Table 5) The conventional wisdom among trade economists is that bilateral trade deficits are not a concern, as they reflect patterns of comparative advantage and are generally offset by surpluses with other trading partners. Large U.S. deficits with energy producers, e.g. Saudi Arabia, are typically taken for granted. In practice, trade deficits with particular countries have been the subject of special attention from the U.S. President and Congress. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, for example, the U.S. government pressured the Japanese government to adopt a wide variety of import-promotion policies aimed at balancing trade. Cox and Ruffin (1998) , have recently shown that bilateral trade deficits may matter in a multi-country trade war. In a three country, non-retaliatory environment bashing a deficit country with a small tariff is beneficial for a large country. The bilateral 31 Garbaccio (1995, pp. 6-8) notes that official U.S. figures overstate the U.S.-China bilateral trade deficit by about one-third. Moreover, although U.S.-China trade deficits have increased by 900 percent between tariff improves the terms of trade of most favored imports (originating from the deficit country) at the expense of least favored imports (from the surplus country). Of course with the tariff the volume of trade falls for favored imports. Hence, an optimal bilateral tariff can be computed. As in Johnson's (1953) classic tariff retaliation model, the Nash equilibrium is comparable to a prisoner's dilemma where all countries lose from a 'country-bashing' trade war. Given that U.S. imports from China are IPR intensive, threats against IPR infringements could be viewed as an attempt to reduce trade deficits with China, and thus improve American terms of trade. IPRs may be the preferred U.S.
policy instrument, as they are less vulnerable to retaliation than tariffs.
Infringing Exports U.S. firms have typically been particularly concerned with infringing uses of their technologies, trademarked products, or copyrighted products when the infringing products are exported to neighboring economies. Exports by Chinese firms of infringing CDs to Hong Kong in late 1995 were a major trigger for the USTR's investigation of China, as U.S.
firms complained that Chinese IPR violations reduced sales by U.S. firms in Hong Kong's lucrative market as well as in mainland China. Why, however, are infringing export activities of particular concern? Isn't a lost sale in Hong Kong equivalent to a lost sale in China?
There are at least four reasons for U.S. firms and the U.S. government to focus on infringing exports. First, pirate operations with economies of scale in production become more viable with infringing exports, as pirates gain additional markets for their products.
Limiting IPR pirates to the Chinese markets will hamper movement down their average cost 1987 and 1994 , the combined deficit with Taiwan, Hong Kong, and China increased by only 40 percent.
curves. Second, in foreign markets with inelastic demands, even small amounts of additional supply can lead to significant reductions in the price, producing a large loss for U.S. firms on legitimate sales. Third, infringing exports place additional burdens on enforcement in the receiving country, effectively transmitting China's enforcement problems to a second country. The additional burden on police and courts could reduce the overall effectiveness of the importing country's enforcement efforts. Finally, increasing integration of national markets has forced many countries to standardize their IPR policies across markets, as markets become more difficult to isolate. In this environment, the U.S. is less likely to tolerate infringing exports of its firms' products, as this may provide a signal to other countries that such behavior is tolerated.
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China's behavior with respect to infringing exports was particularly important to the United States in the mid-1990s. Much of China's growth after 1990 was export driven, and U.S. firms did not want to face additional competition in second countries from pirated versions of their own products. Moreover, the U.S. government had pressured many of China's Asian trading partners to improve their IPR standards and enforcement during the 1980s and 1990s. These countries would be not pleased with dual U.S. standards on domestic piracy and infringing imports.
U.S. Presidential Elections and the Electoral College
The increasing electoral importance of California in U.S. presidential and congressional elections has led U.S. politicians to focus more attention on California's economy and interest groups. California has 54 "winner-take-all" electoral votes in U.S.
presidential elections, or 20 percent of the 270 electoral votes required to win the 32 The U.S. may also maintain a tough stance on flagrant TRIPS violations to set a global example. Wallis (1999) , Wallis (2001), and Fleck (2001) for a discussion of evidence on small-state bias in legislation enacted by the federal government. 35 The Census data used in our analysis are available at http://www.census.gov/epcd/www/econ97.html.
and specific measures of IPR intensity, are reported in all" standard will, however, sometimes produce too much IPR protection too early in some developing countries and is likely to be a source of continued international conflict between developed and developing countries.
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